Miner v. Miner : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1986
Miner v. Miner : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
B.L.Dart, Jr.; Dart, Adamson & Parken; Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent.
David S. Dolowitz; Parsons, Behle & Latimer; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Miner v. Miner, No. 860226 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/114
UTAH 
DOC*. ...-.iT 
K F U 
50 
. / 
L c ; n w , 
BRIEF 
^ et>ozzc> 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
000O000 
£6a^6 -<?>?• 
Case No. 8603^ 
Priority 13(b) 
oooOooo 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the T! 
in and for Salt Lake 
The Honorable Dean E. Condor 
tiird District Court 
County 
Presiding 
B. L.l Dart 
John p. Parken 
DART J ADAMSON & PARKEN 
Suite 1330, 310 South Main 
Salt |Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
David S. Dolowitz 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
N0V171986 
Clark Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 86039 
Priority 13(b) 
oooOooo 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Dean E. Conder, Presiding 
B. L. Dart 
John D. Parken 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
Suite 1330, 310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
David S. Dolowitz 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
NATURE OF CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I 
DR. MINER FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFI-
CIENT TO WARRANT MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 9 
POINT II 
DR. MINER WAS BOUND BY THE PRIOR DENIAL OF 
HIS MOTION TO MODIFY THE PROPERTY DISTRIBU-
TION SO AS TO DIVIDE THE EQUITY EQUALLY . . . 14 
POINT III 
THE MODIFICATION SOUGHT BY DR. MINER WOULD BE 
UNFAIR AND INEQUITABLE 18 
CONCLUSION 19 
i 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Anderson v. Anderson 
13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962) 16 
Chandler v. West 
610 P. 2d 1299 (Utah 1980) 11, 12 
Drury v. Lunceford 
18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662 (1966) 17 
Klein v. Klein 
544 P. 2d 472 (Utah 1975) 16 
Land v. Land 
605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) 12 
Stettler v. Stettler 
713 P. 2d 699 (Utah 1985) 10 
Trego v. Trego 
565 P. 2d 74 (Utah 1977) 16 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 86039 
Priority 13(b) 
oooOooo 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEf 
STATEMENT OF ISSU? 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing 
to modify a fixed-sum equity awarded to the wife in the parties' 
former residence by using those funds to satisfy an alleged but 
unliquidated and unproven tax liability resulting from the 
disallowance by the IRS of a tax shelter acquired by the husband 
during the marriage? 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a domestic relations action in which the 
physician-husband appeals from the denial of his second motion to 
modify the property distribution. The parties were divorced in 
1982 and their assets were subsequently divided. The property 
distribution awarded the parties1 residence to the husband with a 
fixed-sum equity interest requiring four equal annual payments to 
the wife. 
In 1985, the husband left the state, necessitating the 
sale of the residence, and failed to make the first annual equity 
payment. He moved to have the fixed-sum equity interest modified 
to an equal share in the equity. The motion was denied. He did 
not appeal. 
By 1986, the husband was deliquent in two annual 
installments and the house had been sold. He again moved to 
modify the fixed-sum equity interest to allow the payment of 
joint obligations, including an alleged tax deficiency, with the 
remaining equity being distributed equally. His motion was again 
denied. He appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties1 marriage was terminated by an original 
Decree of Divorce entered on February 29, 1984, which reserved 
for later trial, inter alia, the property distribution issue. 
(R. at 329-31, infra at A-2 through A-4.) Following a trial on 
May 21 and 22, 1984, the Honorable Dean E. Conder entered a Memo-
randum Decision on June 5, 1984 (R. at 380-83), and, ultimately, 
entered a Supplemental Decree of Divorce on August 23, 1984 
(R. at 397-402, infra at A-5 through A-10). 
2 
That Decree awarded Plaintiff-Appellant Douglas Lee 
Miner (hereinafter "Dr. Miner") possession and ownership of the 
parties' residence subject to an equity interest in Defendant-
Respondent Carol Jean Miner (hereinafter "Mrs. Miner"). (See, 
Supplemental Decree, paragraphs 5, 7, and 14, R. at 397-402.) 
Judge Conder found (Findings, paragraph 6, R. at 387-88, that the 
residence had a net equity at the time of trial of $135,356.00 
and fixed Mrs. Miner's equity interest in the home at $67,500.00, 
requiring Dr. Miner to pay this amount in four equal annual 
installments of $16,875.00 with interest at the rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annum. (Memorandum Decision, R. at 382 and 
Supplemental Decree at paragraph 14, R. at 401.) Payments were 
to be made on June 1 of each year, beginning in 1985. (Id.) 
Judge Conder found that Dr. Miner, a physician, earned 
$139,104.00 in 1983 (Findings, paragraph 10, R. at 388) and 
ordered Dr. Miner to pay alimony of $1,000.00 per month for 24 
months and then $500.00 per month for an additional 24 months. 
(Supplemental Decree, paragraph 13, R. at 401.) The trial court 
also divided the parties' personal property, ordered Dr. Miner to 
pay Mrs. Miner $1,000.00 per month beginning June 1, 1988, until 
the sum of $67,678.00 (representing one-half of the parties' 
profit sharing account) had been paid with interest at ten 
3 
percent (10%) per annum, and distributed to Dr. Miner stocks 
and securities having a value of approximately $150,000.00. 
Dr. Miner took no appeal from the Decree of Divorce. 
Dr. Miner failed to make the first annual equity 
payment on June 1, 1985, and Mrs. Miner moved for the entry of 
Judgment. (R. at 426.) On June 21, 1985, Judge Conder entered 
an Order resolving several disputes betweem the parties and 
providing that, in the event of the sale of the residence awarded 
to Dr. Miner, all of the installments due on Mrs. Miner's 
$67,500.00 equity interest would be paid and that her interest 
would constitute a lien on the property. (Order, paragraph 3(b), 
R. at 433, infra at A-14.) Dr. Miner took no appeal from that 
Order. The parties stipulated that Mrs. Miner's motion for 
Judgment on the delinquent installment be continued until August 
5, 1985. (R. at 435.) 
A few days later, on July 8, 1985, Dr. Miner moved 
to amend the original property distribution so that Mrs. Miner's 
interest in the equity of the residence awarded to Dr. Miner 
would be one-half of the net sales proceeds rather than the 
fixed amount originally awarded by Judge Conder. (Motion, 
R. at 438-439, infra at A-16 through A-17.) This Motion was 
heard, together with Mrs. Miner's Motion for Judgment on the 
delinquent equity payment, by Domestic Relations Commissioner 
Sandra Peuler, who recommended that Dr. Miner's Motion for 
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Modification be denied and Mrs. Miner be awarded judgment for the 
delinquent equity payment. (R. at 450.) Dr. Miner rejected the 
Commissioner's recommendation (R. at 455) and the matter was 
heard by Judge Conder, who denied Dr. Miner's Motion for 
Modification (Order, R. at 461-62, infra at A-18 through A-19) 
and granted Mrs. Miner judgment for the delinquent equity payment 
(Judgment, R. at 459-60). Dr. Miner did not appeal. 
Almost a year later, and by then also delinquent on 
the second annual equity installment, Dr. Miner again moved to 
modify the fixed-amount equity interest awarded to Mrs. Miner in 
the original property distribution, this time couching his motion 
in terms of "relief from judgment" under Rule 60(b) (7) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Motion, R. at 463-65, infra, at 
A-20 through A-23.) Dr. Miner based his motion upon the fact 
that the sale of the home had produced approximately $30,000.00 
less than anticipated at the entry of the original property 
distribution and upon the allegation that the IRS had, in the 
meantime, determined that "Geothermal Partners II," in which 
Dr. Miner had invested as a tax shelter, had been determined by 
the IRS to be a sham, supposedly resulting in the disallowance of 
deductions for the tax year 1981 and the imposition of additional 
tax for that year in the approximate amount of $20,000.00. (Id.) 
Additionally, in his Affidavit in support of his motion, 
Dr. Miner speculated that additional deductions taken for the tax 
5 
years 1982 and 1983 would also be disallowed. (Affidavit, 
paragraph 7, R. at 532-35.) 
In response to Dr. Miner's motion, Mrs. Miner pointed 
out that Dr. Miner had failed to present to the Court appropriate 
evidence in support of his claims and that the incomplete copies 
of IRS materials submitted did "not establish what the ultimate 
tax consequence of the IRS's position will be." (Reply, page 3, 
R. at 543-46.) Mrs. Miner also sought an Order of the Court 
directing the payment from the sales proceeds of the residence of 
the full amount of her fixed-sum equity interest together with 
accrued interest (Motion, R. at 540-42) or, in the alternative, 
Judgment for the second delinquent installment (Motion, 
R. at 558-59) . 
A hearing on these motions was held before Judge 
Conder on June 12, 1986. (See, generally. Transcript, 
R. at 586-604.) At that hearing, Dr. Miner called no witnesses, 
submitted no evidence, and made no proffers of proof. It was 
acknowledged, however, that neither of the two delinquent equity 
installments had been paid. Counsel for Mrs. Miner pointed out 
to Judge Conder that there was no real evidence as to what the 
IRS might ultimately do with the disallow€>d 1981 deduction, 
noting that even though disallowed in 1981, it might be possible 
to take the deduction for the 1982 or 1983 tax year. 
(Transcript, R. at 597-98.) Having heard the arguments of 
6 
counsel for both parties, Judge Conder wisely noted that the 
value of the residence awarded to Dr. Miner 
could have gone up, or it could go down. 
I take it as to what I have to work on at the 
time and I made that distribution and that 
division of the equity. I'm going to stand on 
that, for whatever payment the doctor was 
obligated to make under the terms of that 
equity. . . . 
As to the tax liability, I think it would 
be a horrendous obligation at this time to try 
to decide who has got what taxes to pay. 
Transcript of Hearing, R. at 599-600. Judge Conder thus 
determined that the IRS, not the state court, should 
determine which of the parties was responsible for any tax 
liability ultimately and finally found to be owing. A 
written Order was entered denying Dr. Miner's motion for 
modification. (R. at 571-73, infra at A-29 through A-31.) 
Dr. Miner appealed. (R. at 578-79.) 
At Dr. Miner's request, Judge Conder stayed 
execution on any of the prior judgments and placed a portion 
of the sales proceeds of the residence awarded to Dr. Miner 
in an interest-bearing trust account pending the resolution 
of this Appeal. (Order, R. at 562-63A.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Modification of property distributions 
— as opposed to alimony and support awards — should be 
made with reluctance and only where clearly necessitated by 
the circumstances. The trial court's grant or denial of 
modification of a property distribution is viewed with great 
deference and will be reversed on appeal only if consti-
tuting an abuse of discretion or misapplication of relevant 
law. Dr. Miner failed to present any substantial evidence 
to the trial court in support of his request for modifica-
tion and the trial courtfs denial of that modification, 
therefore, cannot be reversed on appeal. 
POINT II: By the time the trial court denied 
Dr. Miner's second request for modification, from which he 
now appeals, Dr. Miner was delinquent on both the first and 
second annual installment on Mrs. Miner's fixed-sum equity 
position in the residence that had been awarded to 
Dr. Miner. Both of Dr. Miner's motions for modification 
were prompted by his delinquency in the required install-
ments and both sought to modify the original Decree so as to 
distribute equally the equity in the residence. Having 
failed to appeal from the first denial of his motion, 
Dr. Miner should not now be heard to complain of the denial 
of his subsequent motion. 
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POINT III: The modification sought by Dr. Miner 
was unfair and unwarranted by the circumstances. Not only 
was the claimed tax obligation hypothetical in nature 
because no final determination had been made by the IRS, but 
also, if such an obligation arises, it will be because of 
the IRS's determination that the tax shelter "invested" in 
by Dr. Miner is a sham. During the marriage, Dr. Miner 
handled all of the financial affairs of the parties and did 
not consult with Mrs. Miner in connection with the invest-
ment he now claims may ultimately expose both parties to a 
joint obligation to the IRS. Having selected the investment 
from which the joint obligation may arise, Dr. Miner should 
not be permitted to satisfy that joint obligation out of 
property awarded to Mrs. Miner. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DR. MINER FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO 
WARRANT MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION. 
As the Appellant appealing from the District 
Court's refusal to modify a property distribution, Dr. Miner 
faces a very heavy burden. While divorce actions are 
equitable in nature, this Court has consistently adhered to 
the firmly established principle that the trial courtfs 
decisions are to be accorded a great deal of deference and 
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will not be reversed on appeal absent some clear showing of 
an abuse of discretion or misapplication of relevant law. 
This Court's decision in Stettler v. Stettler, 
713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985), is typical of the many cases 
recognizing, and according great deference to, the trial 
court's advantaged position to review and determine the 
respective rights of the parties in domestic relations 
matters. In Stettler, the wife was awarded a fixed-amount 
equity interest in the parties' residence, which was to be 
paid upon the sale of the home or the attainment by the 
youngest child of the age of 18 years. The home was awarded 
to the husband. Following the divorce, both parties re-
married and the wife left the state. She petitioned for 
modification, seeking an immediate payment of her equity so 
as to be able to provide a proper home for her children when 
they visited. This Court noted that while the modification 
of a divorce Decree was a matter of equity 
the Court accords considerable deference 
to the judgment of the trial court. Its 
judgment will not be disturbed unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary 
or unless the trial court abuses its discretion 
or misapplies principles of law. 
713 P.2d at 701 (emphasis added, footnote citations 
omitted). Accordingly, by the standard set forth by this 
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Court in one of the cases upon which he relies, Dr. Miner 
faces a very heavy burden in this appeal. 
Moreover, it is significant to note that the 
modification sought by Dr. Miner in this case was of the 
property distribution rather than the alimony or support 
provisions of the original Decree. In one of the cases upon 
which Dr. Miner himself relies, Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 
1299 (Utah 1980), this Court held that: 
[P]roperty settlements are entitled to a 
greater sanctity than alimony and support 
payments in proceedings to modify divorce 
decrees. 
610 P.2d at 1300 (citation omitted). This Court also held 
that, where the District Court has refused to modify its 
own earlier property distribution, 
[tjhat determination, based on the [trial] 
court's review of the facts and circumstances, 
should not be overturned unless it results in 
such manifest injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, even the cases upon which 
Dr. Miner relies require him to demonstrate a "manifest 
injustice" in order to prevail in this appeal. This is a 
burden that he simply cannot meet. 
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Both this Court's decision in Chandler v. West, 
supra, and Dr. Miner in his Brief, rely upon this Court's 
decision in Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), in 
which this Court was called upon to determine the circum-
stances under which a property distribution might be 
modified. While the property distribution in Land was based 
upon a stipulation of the parties, the test enunciated by 
this Court in that case has consistently been cited in 
connection with the modification of property distributions 
generally, without regard to whether they came about by 
stipulation or, as in this case, by the decision of the 
trial court. While recognizing the trial court's continuing 
jurisdiction to modify a property distribution, this Court 
was careful to point out that 
the law limits the continuing juris-
diction of the [trial] court where a 
property settlement agreement has been 
incorporated into the decree, and the 
outright abrogation of the provisions 
of such an agreement is only to be 
resorted to with great reluctance and 
for compelling reasons. 
605 P.2d at 1251 (footnote citations omitted). 
In this case, Dr. Miner simply failed to present 
sufficient evidence to the trial court to justify the modi-
fication that he sought. He called no witnesses and he 
proffered no testimony; therefore, the only evidence even 
arguably before the trial court was his own Affidavit. Yet 
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that Affidavit merely recites the fact that the IRS has indi-
cated that it will deny a depreciation deduction for the 
1981 tax year and that Dr. Miner fears that a similar fate 
awaits deductions for the 1982 and 1983 tax years. The 
Affidavit and its attachments are devoid of any reference 
to a final determination by the IRS with respect to the 1981 
tax year and, with respect to the 1982 and 1983 tax years, 
the only information presented is Dr. Miner's speculation 
and fear that the IRS may take similar action. This extreme 
weakness in Dr. Miner's "evidence" to the trial court was 
pointed out at the hearing by Mrs. Miner's counsel 
(R. at 597-98), yet Dr. Miner took no steps to remedy the 
deficiency. He cannot now complain that the trial court 
failed to make the requisite findings to justify the 
modification that he sought. 
The Record simply fails to support either the 
modification refused by the District Court or the reversal 
of that refusal by this Court. Dr. Miner failed to carry 
his burden before the trial court and utterly fails in that 
effort before this Court. 
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POINT He DR. MINER WAS BOUND BY THE PRIOR DENIAL OF HIS 
MOTION TO MODIFY THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION SO AS TO DIVIDE 
THE EQUITY EQUALLY. 
The Supplemental Decree by which the District 
Court originally divided the parties1 assets awarded to 
Mrs. Miner an equity interest in the residence, which was 
awarded to Dr. Miner, in the fixed amount of $67,500.00, 
providing that it was to be paid with twelve percent 
interest in four equal annual installments beginning June 1, 
1985. (Supplemental Decree, paragraph 14, R. at 401). 
Dr. Miner took no appeal from that Decree. Dr. Miner failed 
to make the first payment when it became due. The trial 
court entered an Order providing that if the home awarded to 
Dr. Miner were sold, all of the four annual payments would 
become immediately due. (Order, paragraph 3(b), 
R. at 43 3.) Dr. Miner took no appeal. 
Faced with Mrs. Miner's pending motion for the 
entry of judgment with respect to the delinquent 1985 equity 
payment (R. at 426), Dr. Miner moved to modify the original 
property distribution so as to divide the equity in the 
residence equally. (Motion, R. at 438.) The Commissioner 
recommended (R. at 450), and the District Court ordered 
(R. at 461-62) the denial of the motion. Dr. Miner took no 
appeal. 
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In June of 1986, Dr. Miner, never having paid 
the first equity installment, also became delinquent on the 
second equity installment due to Mrs. Miner. He filed 
his second motion for modification, this time styling it as 
a "Motion for Relief from Supplemental Decree." 
(R. at 463-65.) It was only upon the denial of this second 
motion that Dr. Miner filed his appeal to this Court. 
By his second motion, Dr. Miner sought precisely 
the same relief that he had sought in his first motion from 
which he filed no appeal. In both motions, he sought to 
modify the original fixed-sum equity awarded to Mrs. Miner 
so as to divide the equity equally. In both motions, he 
relied upon the fact that he had moved to Texas and the 
decline in the market value of the property and, in the 
second, the alleged imposition of additional taxes. As 
noted by the Trial Court, the move to Texas was "certainly 
the choice" of Dr. Miner. (Minute Entry, R. at 458.) As 
discussed under Point I, above, the evidence produced with 
respect to the alleged additional tax obligation is insuffi-
cient to justify modification. The fact that the market 
value of the property went down rather than up, also, does 
not justify the modification of a fixed-amount equity 
award: Dr. Miner certainly would not have complained had 
property values continued to rise as expected. In any 
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event, a change in property value is to be anticipated, 
particularly in today's real estate markets. 
The significant fact is, however, that the 
relief repeatedly sought by Dr. Miner is precisely the 
same: market conditions having changed, he would prefer to 
receive an equal share of the equity resulting from the sale 
of the residence occasioned by his move to Texas rather than 
receiving merely the remaining equity after the payment of 
the fixed amount due Mrs. Miner. Having failed to appeal 
the original denial of his motion, Dr. Miner should not now 
be heard to complain of the denial of his second motion for 
the same relief. As this Court noted in Trego v. Trego, 
565 P.2d 74 (Utah 1977): 
When there has been an adjudication on 
one set of facts, that should be res 
adjudicata and there should be no modi-
fication unless some material change or 
circumstance as would warrant doing so. 
565 P.2d at 75. To the same effect is this Court's decision 
in Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975) and Anderson v. 
Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962). 
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The need for finality of judgments was similarly 
emphasized by this Court in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 
415 P.2d 662 (1966), in which it was held that it is inappro-
priate for a party whose motion has been once denied to re-
apply for the same relief. In so holding, this Court wisely 
noted that: 
[I]f the party ruled against were 
permitted to go beyond the rules, make 
a motion for reconsideration, and per-
suade the judge to reverse himself, the 
question arises, why should not the 
other party who is now ruled against 
be permitted to make a motion for re-
re-consideration, asking the court to 
again reverse himself? Tenacious liti-
gants and lawyers might persist in 
motions, arguments and pressures and 
theoretically a judge could go on 
reversing himself periodically at the 
entreaties of one or the other of the 
parties ad infinitum. 
415 P.2d at 663 (original emphasis). These observations are 
particularly appropriate to facts such as those presented by this 
case in which every time Dr. Miner was confronted with another 
delinquent annual equity installment, he moved for modification 
of the Decree under which that obligation arose. Such repeated 
applications were appropriately rejected by the trial court. 
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POINT III, THE MODIFICATION SOUGHT BY DR. MINER WOULD BE UNFAIR 
AND INEQUITABLE. 
The modification sought by Dr. Miner would result in 
the feared additional tax liability being paid out of the fixed-
sum equity interest originally awarded to Mrs. Miner. The most 
that can be said for such a modification is that it is an attempt 
by Dr. Miner to pay a hypothetical joint liability from assets 
awarded to Mrs. Miner. In that regard, it truly seeks to compare 
the proverbial "apples and oranges": It seeks to pay their 
supposed obligation with her assets. 
The proposed modification is also unfair because it 
was Dr. Miner who, without the knowledge or active consent of 
Mrs. Miner, "invested" in the tax shelter now claimed by the IRS 
to be a sham. As set forth in Mrs. Miner"s Affidavit in 
opposition to the motion for modification, it was Dr. Miner "who 
made all financial decisions without explanation" to Mrs. Miner. 
(Affidavit, paragraph 5, R. at 554, infra at A-25.) Dr. Miner 
invested in the tax shelter in late December of 1981 as a general 
partner and it was he who had the responsibility to determine the 
advisability of that "investment." (Id., R. at 554-55.) Since 
it was Dr. Miner who chose to make the "investment," it is unfair 
that he should now seek to pay the supposed additional tax 
liability from the assets awarded to Mrs. Miner. 
18 
Judge Conder wisely left it up to the IRS and the Tax 
Court to determine, as between Dr. and Mrs. Miner, where should 
rest the burden of any additional tax ultimately and finally 
imposed by the IRS. Judge Conder, in ruling from the bench, 
noted that he would "leave the tax return with the Internal 
Revenue Service and let the chips fall where they may." 
(Tr., R. at 602.) 
Dr. Miner's request for modification was unfair. It 
was he who voluntarily chose to abandon the residence in Salt 
Lake and move to Texas. It was he who selected the tax shelter 
claimed to be a sham by the IRS and it was he who selected the 
accountant who allegedly made an error in addition. Mrs. Miner's 
interest in the equity of the residence was in a fixed amount; 
had the value of the property gone up, Dr. Miner would certainly 
have been entitled to resist any attempt by her to gain a larger 
share than had originally been awarded. The proposed modi-
fication is merely an attempt to pay an unliquidated joint 
obligation out of the property distribution awarded to 
Mrs. Miner. The Trial Court properly denied the requested 
modification. 
CONCLUSION 
Property settlements, as distinguished from alimony 
and support awards, should be modified only with reluctance and 
where the circumstances clearly necessitate modification. In 
this case, Dr. Miner presented no testimony and proffered no 
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evidence in support of his request for modification. His 
Affidavit and the attachments to it indicate merely that the IRS 
may impose an additional tax for 1981. There was no final deter-
mination or adjudication to that effect. Under such circum-
stances, the evidence in support of the modification was 
insufficient to justify it and it was properly denied. 
Both times Dr. Miner was faced with a delinquent 
annual equity installment, he moved the Court to modify the 
Decree creating that obligation. Both times the trial court 
denied that motion. Having failed to appeal from the first 
denial, Dr. Miner should not now be permitted to complain of the 
second denial. Both motions sought precisely the same relief. 
The modification sought by Dr. Miner was properly 
rejected by the trial court because it was neither warranted by 
nor fair under the circumstances. At most, the potential 
additional tax liability that the parties will face is a joint 
obligation, whereas the proposed modification would pay that 
joint obligation from assets awarded to Mrs. Miner (the equity in 
the residence). Since the tax shelter that may ultimately result 
in an additional tax liability was selected by Dr. Miner without 
consultation with Mrs. Miner, it is not fair that he should 
impose their obligation upon her. 
20 
The trial court correctly refused to modify its 
original property distribution and that carefully considered 
refusal should be affirmed in all respects. 
o 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ^ day of November, 
1986. 
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the foregoing Respondent's Brief to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to David S. Dolowitz, Parsons, Behle & Latimer, 
Attorneys for Appellant, P. 0. Box 11898, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84147-0898. 
22 
ADDENDUM 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Original Decree of Divorce (29 February 1984) A-2 
Supplemental Decree (23 August 1984) 
(contains original property distribution ) . . . . . . . A-5 
Order (21 June 1985) 
(Mrs. Miner's lien to be paid upon sale of residence) . . A-ll 
First Motion for Modification (8 July 1985) 
("Motion") A-16 
Order (25 September 1985) 
(Denying first motion for modification) A-18 
Second Motion for Modification (4 June 1986) 
("Motion for Relief from Judgment") A-20 
Affidavit (11 June 1986) 
(in opposition to second motion for modification) . . . . A-24 
Order (24 June 1986) 
(denying second motion for modification) A-29 
A-l 
V FILMED 
y %J &*> "o- ••: •'' ^  -
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
F,LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
SaH LskG County UUn 
fEB 2 9 ^ 
i-i. Dixon 
X Court 
'fit./!? VO.ZW 
DECREE OP DIVORCE 
Civil No. D83-2353 
Judge Dean E. Conder 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
pretrial conference with Commissioner Sandra Pueler presiding 
on Friday, the 24th day of February, 1984. The plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel, David S. 
Dolowit2. The defendant was present in person and represented 
by counsel, B. L. Dart. The counsel advised the Commissioner 
that all matters were in issue and would have to go to trial 
but that counsel believed that it was in the best interest of 
both parties and their children that the issue of terminating 
the marriage be resolved immediately. The Commissioner 
determined that counsel was correct and referred the matter tc 
A-2 
the judge to whom this matter was assigned, The Honorable Dean 
E. Conder. Counsel for the parties appeared before Judge 
Conder who determined to accept the request of the parties and 
the recommendation of the Commissioner, heard the stipulations 
of counsel and the parties and the testimony of each of the 
parties and being advised thus in the premises and having 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. The parties are granted a decree of divorce, each 
from the other, the same to become final upon entry. 
2. All remaining issues in this matter are reserved 
for trial and there shall be no evidence or issue preclusion by 
reason of the fact that the decree of divorce has been entered 
in this matter. 
3. The court, on its own, directs and orders each of 
the parties not to make any derogatory statement about the 
other to or in front of the minor children of the parties. 
4. This matter shall be placed upon the trial 
calendar so that the remaining issues can come before the court 
for trial. 
day of February, 1984Y,, 
^ 
DEAN E\ CONDER, . 
District Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DJXCW aiNCX-EY ' 
~*~ - • — - — ' Bf ) j -y •-;:--* 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Decree of Divorce 
Civil No. D83-2583 
Miner v. Miner 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ & 
fot Plaintiff 
/ 
B. L„ DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
7137K 
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rr.xo' 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE" COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No, D-83-2353 
Judge Dean E. Conder 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court fo 
trial on May 21 and May 22, 1984, the Honorable Dean E. Conde 
presiding. The plaintiff was present in person and represente 
by counsel David S. Dolowitz. The defendant was present i 
person and represented by counsel B. L. Dart, Jr. The Cour 
T\eard and considered ttie testimony of each, of the parties an 
the witnesses offered in their behalf, reviewed and considere 
the exhibits accepted into evidence on behalf of each of th 
parties, heard arguments of counsel and considered the lega 
and factual arguments presented to the Court in written an 
A-5 
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oral form, after having previously granted a decree of divoro 
to each of the parties and now being advised in the premise: 
and having published its memorandum decision on the 5th day o 
[June, 1984, and having made and entered its supplementa 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1* Care, custody and control of the minor childre 
of the parties is awarded to the plaintiff, their father 
subject to reasonable and liberal rights of visitation in th 
defendant which visitation shall be for David and Krista, an 
if they so desire, Barbara and Katie: 
a. Every other Saturday morning at 9:00 a.n 
until Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b# Every other red letter holiday and the 24t 
of July, with the exception of Mother's Day which shall alwa^  
be spent with the defendant and Father's Day which shall alwa] 
be spent with the plaintiff. 
<:• The children may visit with their moth( 
during the week as they (the children) desire but they rau, 
notify the plaintiff or his housekeeper that they are visiti 
and must be home by dinner time. 
d. The defendant shall have the right to 
summer visitation period which shall not exceed two weeks a 
this should be planned with the children to take into accou 
their schedules. 
-2-
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e. The plaintiff shall have a right to take 
summer trip with the children of at least two weeks duration. 
f. The defendant is admonished and requested t 
plan meaningful activities with and for the children when the 
are visiting with her. 
g. Barbara and Katie shall arrange such visita 
tion with the defendant as they deem mutually desirable. 
h. All visitation between the defendant, Davi 
and Krista shall be arranged so that David and Krista visit th 
defendant together. 
2. Each of the parties to this matter, the plaintif 
and the defendant, is enjoined and prohibited from makin 
derrogatory remarks about the other to the children about th 
other parent. 
3. Each of the parties in this matter is enjoine 
and prohibited from using the children to get back at the othe 
parent. 
4. Neither party shall annoy, harass the other o 
make physical contact with the other. 
5. The defendant is enjoined and prohibited fro 
going on or about the property at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt Lak 
City, Utah except as incident to picking up or returning th 
children from a visit when said visit is a regularly schedule 
visit. 
-3-
A-7 
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6. The defendant at this time is not ordered to pa 
lany child support to the plaintiff for and on behalf of th 
children. 
7. The home and real property located at 155 
Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah is awarded to the plaintil 
subject to the equitable interest of the defendant which sha] 
I be paid as is hereinafter set out. 
| 8. The plaintiff is awarded the Scout automobile 
the furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances located : 
the home at 1522 Roxbury Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, except < 
are herein awarded specifically to the defendant, his i: 
account? one-half of the food storage? one-half of tl 
paintings? his gun collection? his camera and photographic 
equipment? one-half of the profit sharing account, to-wi 
$67,678 subject to the provisions for division of this accou 
as are herein set out? one-half of his interest in t 
Geothermal tax shelter. 
9. All of the stock received by the plaintiff fr 
his parents either before or during the marriage is awarded 
him as his sole and separate property as said property is n 
part of the marital estate. 
10. The defendant is awarded an equity interest 
the home of the parties valued at $67,500 to be paid as 
herein set out? the Honda automobile? the two bank accounts 
-4-
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First Security Bank totalling $5,637; one-half of the foo 
storage; one-half of the paintings; the china, crystal an 
silverware; the sporting equipment and one-half of the profi 
sharing account in the amount of $67,678 which should b 
distributed as is hereinafter set forth and one-half interes 
of the parties in the Geothermal tax shelter. 
11. The plaintiff is ordered to pay, assume and hoi 
harmless the defendant from the following debts and obliga 
tions: the debt to his father, A* 0. Miner, in the amount o 
$4,480 toward the purchase of the home on Roxbury Road; th 
VISA account; the Fort Douglas Account; the Deseret Foundatio 
obligation and any and all sums due to his parents or family. 
12. Each of the parties is ordered to pay all debt 
and obligations incurred by them since their separation. 
13. The plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendan 
alimony in the sum of $1,000 per month for 24 months commencin 
with the month of June in 1984 and then the sum of $500 pe 
month for 24 months after which time alimony shall terminate. 
14. The defendant's equity in the home shall be pai 
in four annual installments of $16,875 principal plus accrue 
interest at 12% per annum on the unpaid balance with the firs 
payment to be made on or before June 1, 1985 and then eac 
June 1 thereafter until the debt is paid in full. Interest o 
this sum commences as of June 5, 1984. 
-5-
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15. The plaintiff is ordered to pay to the defendant 
the sum of $67,678 (being one-half of the profit sharing 
account) at the rate of $1,000 per month beginning June 1, 
1988. Payments are to be applied first to accrued interest 
which shall accrue at the rate of 10% per annum, and then the 
balance to principal. Interest shall accrue on this sum from 
June 5, 1984. 
16. Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and 
attorneys1 fees. 
17. Each of the parties is ordered to sign all 
documents and carry out all steps necessary to effect the 
above-stated order. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of ^-j^vx t , 1984. 
1 1 i i > 
! A CONDER DEAN E.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING THE ORDER OF THE COURT: 
David S. Dolowitz ^^ 
ATTEST 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
B. L. Dart 
Attorney for Defendant 
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B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, : 
Plaintiff, ; ORDER 
v. : 
CAROL JEAN MINER, : Civil No. D83-2353 
Defendant. : Judge Conder 
oooOooo 
Hearing on defendant's Motion for an Order 
enforcing the terms of the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered 
came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court on 
the 31st day of May, 1985, at the hour Of 10:00 a.m., the 
Honorable Commissioner Sandra Peuler presiding; plaintiff 
appearing by and through his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and 
defendant appearing in person and being represented by her 
attorney, John D. Sheaffer, Jr., on behalf of B. L. Dart; and the 
matter having been submitted and a recommendation having been 
made, and the recommendation having not been accepted by 
1 
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plaintiff and the matter having then come on for further hearing 
before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, and the Court having heard 
arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the file in this 
matter, and having an opportunity to have spoken with the minor 
children of the parties, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
!• The plaintiff is moving from the state of Utah on 
the 22nd of June and the children have expressed a desire to have 
visitation with the defendant but not prior to their move because 
of their desire to say goodbye to their friends and attend 
various social functions which have been planned by reason of 
their move. Because of this circumstance it is ordered that the 
defendant's request for summer visitation from June 9, 1985 to 
June 20, 1985 is denied, but for the summer of 1985 defendant is 
awarded visitation for a two week period during the month of 
August at defendant's option with defendant to notify plaintiff 
by the 15th of July of the two week period of time she desires 
summer visitation* 
As a further order, each of the parties shall be 
obligated to pay one-half of the transportation expenses of the 
children from the state of Texas to and from the state of Utah or 
the state of California whichever of the latter two states 
2 
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defendant elects as the state where she desires to exercise her 
summer visitation for 1985• 
2. Defendant has waived any claim she might have in 
the food storage and plaintiff is hereby awarded all of the 
paintings of the parties pursuant to an agreement of the parties 
in exchange for a modification of the Decree of Divorce as it 
relates to alimony and is hereinafter provided. 
3* Defendant is hereby awarded, in addition to the 
alimony provided in the original Decree of Divorce, an award of 
alimony from plaintiff of 18 installments in the amount of $500 
each, which alimony shall not terminate upon the remarriage of 
defendant but shall terminate upon defendant's death as to any 
installments which have not yet come c|ue at the time of her 
death. 
Payment of these installments of alimony shall be 
on a monthly basis commencing with the month of June, 1986, with 
payments to be paid on or before the 2Dth day of the month in 
which due, except that there will be an acceleration of the due 
date of the installments upon the happening of the following 
events: 
a. In the event defendant does remarry so that 
her alimony obligation created under tfce Decree of Divorce is 
terminated, then plaintiff's obligation for the payment of these 
3 
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installments shall be accelerated so that commencing with the 
month following the termination of alimony under the original 
Decree of Divorce, plaintiff shall pay to defendant two (2) 
installments each month to be paid by the 20th day of the month 
until all installments have been paid. 
b. In the event of the sale of the house of the 
house and real property at 1522 Roxbury Road by plaintiff, all of 
the installments shall become immediately due and shall 
constitute a lien against said house and real property until 
paid. 
4. The plaintiff shall pay to defendant within thirty 
days the balance owing on the savings accounts awarded to 
defendant in the Supplemental Decree of Divorce heretofore 
entered, in the sum of $1,387 together with interest at the rate 
of ten percent per annum. In the event plaintiff does not pay to 
defendant the balance owing on said savings accounts, together with 
interest, within thirty days then judgment in said sum shall enter 
in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. 
5. The plaintiff has no documents relating to stock 
in Geothermal, and he has been unable to obtain these documents. 
The plaintiff shall cooperate in all ways necessary to enable the 
defendant to obtain docouments relating to the stock in Geothermal. 
4 
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6. Defendant is awarded attorney's fees in connection 
with this proceeding in the sum of $150. 
DATED this *~ / day of June, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
DEAN EQ CONDER 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
ATTfcST 
DAVID S . DOLOWITZ 
5 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ^-dd^l^Wu^-3"^ 
of and for ' •VL=*^5g^Li 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIKEg Qfe 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, DT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * 
Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter hereby moves 
the above-entitled court to modify the provisions of the Decree 
of Divorce on file herein, to provide that the home acquired by 
the parties on Roxbury Road, in Salt Lake City, Utah, be sold 
and the net proceeds of sale be divided equally between the 
parties, that the provisions of the Decree of Divorce which 
required the plaintiff to pay the defendant for her interest in 
the home be vacated and this modification be effected on the 
grounds that at the time the court made its Decree, the 
plaintiff intended to live in the home and raise the children 
MOTION 
Civil No. D83-2353 
Judge Dean Conder 
A-16 
of the parties in the home, but he has now been required, as a 
result of a change in employment, to move to the state of 
Texas, that the home is for sale, that he has been required to 
purchase a home in Texas, and is presently making payments on 
both the Salt Lake City home (to preserve the equity of both of 
the parties) and the home in Texas for himself and the children 
of the parties, and it is thus fair and equitable to modify the 
Decree of Divorce to require a simple division of the equity of 
the parties in the home rather than require the plaintiff to 
make payments to the defendant. 
DATED this S 7 — day of July, 1985. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to the 
following on this 3~ day of July, 1985: 
Mr. B. L. Dart 
Attorney at Law 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
7653A 
-2-
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B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR MODIFICATION 
Civil No. D83-2353 
Judge Conder 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo-— 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
CAROL JEAN MINER, : 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce by 
modifying defendant's entitlement to receive payments on her 
interest in the residence of the parties came on regularly for 
hearing on the 20th day of August, 1985, plaintiff by his 
attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing by her 
attorney, B. L. Dart, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings 
and having heard arguments, finds that the changes of plaintiff 
in his professional work and move from Utah to Texas were 
voluntary and are not legally sufficient to justify a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce, and the Court being fully 
advised, 
1 
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denied. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That plaintiff's Motion for Modification is hereby 
DATED this 2>«5 day of Ati^^st, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
\mm<**-
DISTRICT JDDGE 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, ) 
) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENT 
V. ) 
) Civil No. D83-2353 
CAROL JEAN MINER, ) Judge Dean E. Conder 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * 
Plaintiff hereby moves the above-entitled court, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and, based on the court's continuing 
jurisdiction under the provisions of S 30-3-5, UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1953) to amend the Decree of Divorce made and entered herein 
on August 23, 1984, in particular, paragraphs 10 and 14 
thereof, wherein the court determined that the equity of the 
parties in their home, $135,900.00, should be divided equally 
between them and that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant 
the sum of $67,500.00 over four years in four installments at 
FILE0 IM 01 roles OFHCE 
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interest on the grounds that the home was valued by the court 
at $235,000.00, but that the home, when sold by the plaintiff, 
produced a gross selling price of $215,000.00 and a net sales 
price of approximately $202,100.00; that is approximately 
$33,000.00 less than the court ruled, and on the further groun< 
that the Geothermal Partnership which the court divided equally 
between the parties has been disallowed for tax purposes by th< 
Internal Revenue Service for the tax year 1981 which has 
produced a claim against the parties for the sum of $20,767.15 
in 1981 and an additional claim for interest penalty that will 
have to be paid after all the other taxes are paid as a penalty 
which will be in the approximate sum of $19,000.00, but which 
sum cannot be fully determined until the taxes for that year 
are paid and an additional tax in 1982 in the approximate sum 
of $10,584.69, which sum cannot be fully determined until that 
tax is paid, incurred as a result of an accounting error in the 
preparation of the 1982 taxes by the accounting firm, plus 
interest penalty that cannot be determined until the taxes, 
interest and penalty are paid. In addition, plaintiff 
anticipates additional assessments of taxes, interest and 
penalty for 1982 and 1983, based on the disallowance of the 
Geothermal Partnership of approximately $10,000.00. 
Plaintiff specifically moves the court to amend the 
decree by vacating the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 14 of 
-2-
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the Decree and to vacate the judgment for $24,975.00 plus 
interest at 12 percent entered on August 25, 1985 as 
enforcement by this court of the provisions of paragraphs 10 
and 14 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and after vacating all 
those provisions, require that the parties use the proceeds of 
sale from their home, first to pay all taxes due for the tax 
years 1981, 1982 and 1983, and, thereafter, to divide the net 
proceeds of sale equally between the parties. 
All supporting documents are attached to the 
memorandum in support of this motion, except plaintiff's 
accountant's worksheets demonstrating the scope of the tax 
liability and those are attached hereto. 
u^ 0 
DATED this T — day of V^^J? , 1986. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
-3-
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•MJttCTTg CERTIFICATE y A * 
I hereby certify that I caused to be wailed; yubLaye 
prcpa-id, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to the 
following on this If day of H&~-* , 1986: 
Mr. B. L. Dart 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
9991A 
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B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-—oooOooo 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAROL JEAN MINER, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION AND IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
Civil No. ~D8-5-2353> 
Judge Dean E. Conder 
oooOooo 
) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Carol Miner, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is the defendant in the above-captioned 
action. 
2. Defendant has spoken with the children and 
tentatively arranged with them for summer visitation in 1986 from 
the 1st of August to the 14th of August. It is her desire that 
the Court set down these dates as her visitation entitlement 
dates under the same provisions which the Court ordered last year 
providing that each of the parties bear one-half of the 
1 
A-24 553 
transportation costs between the children's home in Texas and the 
plaintiff's home in California. 
3. During the period since the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, plaintiff has been chronically late on his payments of 
alimony and at the present time has not made the May installment. 
It is defendant's desire that the Court specify a date certain in 
each month when the alimony is due so that there can be no 
question of when defendant is entitled to the alimony* In respect 
to this request, defendant asks the Court to set the payment date 
as the 5th of the month for which the alimony is due. 
4. The Decree of Divorce was modified by stipulation 
in May of 1985 where it was provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 
Order that defendant's claim to paintings would be waived and 
those paintings would be awarded to plaintiff. Concurrently, 
defendant was awarded from plaintiff, an alimony award of $500 a 
month for 18 installments, a total of $9,000* Under the 
provisions of paragraph 3b, it was provided that in the event of 
the sale of the home at 1522 Roxbury Road, all the installments 
would become immediately due and by reason of the sale, which has 
now occurred, defendant desires that she be awarded a judgment 
for all 18 installments with the money to be paid out of the 
proceeds of sale. 
5. During the marriage of the parties, plaintiff was 
the party who made all financial decisions without explanation to 
defendant. This included the investment which was made by 
2
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plaintiff in December of 1981 in the Geothermal Partners II* 
Plaintiff made this investment it now appears as a general 
partner under circumstances where he had the responsibility to 
determine the advisability of this investment. 
If in fact there are now assessments being made 
based on disallowance by the IRS of certain deductions, then the 
cost of those should be borne by the plaintiff since while it is 
true defendant signed tax returns, she was not knowledgeable as 
to plaintiff's activities and simply followed plaintiff's 
instructions as to the signing of the tax returns each year which 
had been prepared by accountants retained by plaintiff. 
6. From the documentation provided by plaintiff, it 
appears that some of the claimed deductions which the IRS is 
electing to disallow arose out of income sources not declared in 
1982 which may well relate to assets awarded to plaintiff and not 
awarded as marital assets, such as the $150,000 in stocks the 
Court awarded to him as a non-marital asset. It also appears 
that some of the deductions which the IRS is currently 
disallowing may be carried forward and deductible in later years. 
At this time it is impossible to tell what the full tax 
ramification and impact of the action by the IRS is. 
It further appears that plaintiff has received 
from the IRS communications and correspondence relating to the 
disallowance of certain expenses in 1981 and 1982. Defendant has 
3 
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received no information from plaintiff and has not been in a 
position where she could adequately protect herself, and to now 
make her responsible for not only the tax liability but the 
penalties and interest which have accrued would be unfair and 
inappropriate. It is submitted that the relative rights and 
responsibilities between the parties with respect to the claims 
of the IRS should be litigated through the tax courts and the 
ultimate determination by the tax courts should be dispositive. 
This Court should refuse to grant plaintiff's Motion in this 
proceeding and allow the tax courts to make the final 
determination. 
7. It has been necessary for defendant to retain an 
attorney to represent her in the defense of the Motions filed by 
plaintiff in this proceeding and defendant, who is without any 
current employment or independent source of income, is in need of 
the Court to award her attorney's fees in this proceeding. 
DATED this 11th day of June, 1986. 
CAROL JEAN MINER 
\<f } 'S Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of 
June, 1986. 
M r
 NOTARYi PUBLIC^ J Y 
Cbmraission expires: 
Re/sidi/ng at Sa£t Lake Coun 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the // day of June, 1986, I 
hand-delivered a copy of the foregoing Affidavit to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
185 South State, 7th floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for plaintiff. 
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FILED IN CLERICS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN 24 1986 
B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main 
S u i t e 1330 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
H.Dtxi 
a 
tmtouft 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
DOUGLAS LEE MINER, 
P l a i n t i f f , : ORDER 
• • : 
CAROL JEAN MINER, : C i v i l No. D83-2353 
Defendant* : Judge Conder 
oooOooo 
Plaintiff's Motion For Relief From Judgment and 
Defendant's Motion For Enforcement of Terms of Decree of Divorce 
and For Clarification or Alternatively For Amendment of the 
Decree of Divorce both came on regularly for hearing by 
stipulation on Thursday, the 12th day of June, 1986, at the hour 
of 8:00 a.m., plaintiff being represented by his attorney David 
S. Dolowitz and defendant appearing in person and represented by 
her attorney B. L. Dart, and the Court having heard the arguments 
of the respective counsel and certain matters having been 
stipulated and the Court having considered the arguments and the 
stipulations and being fully advised, 
A-29 to* 5' 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant shall have the right to have the minor 
children with her from the 1st of August to the 14th of August. 
The childrens1 desires are to be considered insofar as there may 
be any conflict with prior existing commitments* The cost of 
transportation between plaintiff's home in Texas and defendant's 
home in California shall be divided with defendant to pay the 
cost of transporting the children to California and plaintiff to 
pay the cost of transporting the children back to Texas• 
2. Pursuant to stipulation, it is established that 
plaintiff's payments to defendant of alimony shall be due on the 
fifth day of each month for which the alimony is due and should 
be paid henceforth through the clerk of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, 
3. Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
to change the equity entitlements of the parties in the house and 
real property at 1522 South Roxbury Road by vacating the 
provisions of paragraphs 10 and 14 of the Decree of Divorce and 
to vacate the currently outstanding judgment for $24,975, plus 
interest at 12 percent (12%) entered on August 25, 1985, is 
denied. Plaintiiff's Motion that the parties use the proceeds of 
sale from said house and real property first to pay all taxes due 
for tax years 1981, 1982, and 1983 and thereafter to divide the 
net proceeds of sale equally between the parties is denied. 
2 
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4. Defendant's Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce 
to acce lerate payments by p l a i n t i f f to defendant beyond those 
o r i g i n a l l y provided in the Decree of Divorce i s denied. 
5. Defendant's r e q u e s t for a t torney 1 s f e e s i s d e n i e d , 
each par ty t o bear t h e i r own a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and c o s t s * 
DATED t h i s 3 - Y day of June, 1 9 8 6 . 
BY THE COURT: 
DEAN E. CONDER 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H.CSXC 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
a I hereby certify that on the 
Deputy C!s 
day of June, 1986, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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